However, profound defense adaptation is especially problematic for dominant militaries. To develop my argument, I turn to analyze a Stuxnet-like scenario using the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) concept of Security Studies and the paradigm shift concept of philosophy of science. Security Studies theory, philosophy of science and empirical evidence all suggest that profound defense adaptation demands pressure from outside the expert organization. I argue that Security Studies theory and empirical evidence, including Israel's defense adaptation following short-range rocket threat, suggest that civilian outsiders coalescing with military partners can successfully drive defense adaptation.
To secure the Western world order, the U.S. and its allies need to rearrange their security forces, leveraging the experience accumulated through centuries.
Cyberwarfare is Raging in the Homeland
Chinese bulk espionage and its heavy economic toll has long been the main cybered threat to the U.S. (Brenner & Lindsay, 2015; Cheung, 2009; McConnell, Chertoff, & Lynn, 2012) . In 2010, a direct destructive cyber-attack on computerized Industrial Control Systems (ICS) at a hardened homeland target became a reality (Demchak & Dombrowski, 2011; Denning, 2012; Zetter, 2014) . Ransomware has crippled numerous devices and networks in small business and homes ("Verizon report shows business is booming for cyber-criminals," 2017). Foreign statesponsored adversaries have successfully carried out politically-motivated attacks against civilian targets in the U.S., including Sony Pictures Entertainment (Sharp, 2017) and Sands Casinos (The Australian Strategic Policy, 2015) . Hostile cybered influence operations targeting the democratic process have recently emerged on the cybered conflict agenda (Kragh & Åsberg, 2017; Kramer & Wentz, 2008; Tabansky, 2017) . Cyberwarfare is raging at homeland: cyber-attacks have hit power production, financial services, numerous industries and political processes.
Despite decades of threat awareness, leading technology, superior budgets and capability development, the residual cyber risk to developed nations has skyrocketed. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence has ranked cyber as the top national security risk since 2014, taking over the top spot held by terrorism post-9/11. Why have cybered threats disrupted the security of the most developed nations? I argue that armed forces have failed to adapt strategically to cybered conflict.
Ministries of defense and militaries are bystanders in raging cyberwarfare. This profound national cyber insecurity in the leading states demands scrutiny.
First, I develop the analysis with the fundamental strategic theory guiding every sovereign defense. Using a Stuxnet-like scenario I show how cybered conflict challenges the very fundamentals that we grew accustomed to and treat as axioms. Having established the need for profound defense adaptation, I review the studies of maladaptation -two in the United State and one in Israel --to stress that obstacles to defense adaptation are conceptual rather than technical. I conclude with a discussion of how to facilitate profound change by presenting and analyzing one recent successful innovation in Israel's defense. has been identified. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) is the process by which the DOD may provide support through the federal military force, National Guard, and other resources in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies (e.g., hurricanes and wildfires), special events (e.g., political party national conventions), designated law-enforcement support and other domestic activities. The National Response Framework (NRF) outlines a tiered process in which incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level, providing a process for a state governor to request assistance from the President prior to DoD involvement. Only if directed by the President or SecDef (likely following a state-level request), the DoD may be required to bring its immense capabilities to conduct Cyber-DSCA.
In Israel, the recognition of cyber risks and threats to civilian cyber-physical systems came later than in the U.S. With an understanding of civilian infrastructure and cyber-vulnerabilities garnered from decades of defense experience, in the late 1990's defense leaders communicated cybersecurity concerns to the civilian government. These concerns are today referred to as risks to
CPS. Quoting the key person involved:
In the mid-1990s we in the defense community were looking for suitable targets for cyber exploitation around us [Israel] . Quickly we realized that by far the largest set of targets exists -but it is Israel. Notable in the 2002 resolution is that what today is referred to as 'cyberspace' was not viewed as a virtual environment, or as an independent area of operation. The subject of protection -'computerized information systems' -were defined as being interconnected with physical realms.
Moreover, an 'information' system differentiates from a 'control' system in both concept and practice. An information system 'performs automated activities of input reception, processing, 3 Personal interview with B., Tel Aviv 2014 storage, processing and transmission of information.' A control and supervision system, on the other hand, is 'a computer-integrated system that controls and supervises the frequency and regulation of measurable activities, carried out by mechanized means within the information system itself.'
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The defense sector -especially some specific IDF units -had leading IT-security expertise.
But Israel also rejected a military-centered cyber CIP approach. Designating responsibility for protection of vital computerized systems of civilian bodies to the military in peacetime would create an immense ethical and legal problem for the Israeli democracy. Moreover, given the technical characteristics, delineation of domestic versus foreign ceased to be clear.
In the U.S. and in Israel, the cybered threats to the homeland continued to grow and materialize in various ways. In response, the ministries of defense and armed forces led the development of human capital, technology and doctrine, even running offensive operations in cyberspace. However, none of the ministries of defense and armed forces have been tasked with the leading CIP role, nor a bigger role in protecting the respective societies. The U.S. upholds the voluntary approach to Critical Infrastructure Protection, and the DoD's vast resources can only be utilized after disaster strikes. Despite Israel's state-led defense of Critical Infrastructure and cyberspace in general, Israel does not utilize the MoD's or IDF's expertise and vast resources for these tasks.
The common cyber defense position is that armed forces cannot be responsible for defending society from cyber-attacks on strategic non-military homeland targets by foreign adversaries. National cybersecurity tasks and associated practices require a presence in domestic networks, while existing laws prohibit the armed forces from domestic operations. Armed forces have been adapting to cybered conflict: navies seek to leverage new technologies to improve the effectiveness in the seas; air forces do the same in the air, and so forth. The doctrine remains largely intact, with cyber technology playing only a supporting role to existing concepts of operations.
This kind of adaptation is not only rational but also required by the applicable laws.
I argue that the defense adaptation that has been progressing is in fact misguided. I do not refer to the pace of change, nor to resource allocation. The main problem is the misguided direction of change, as it has neglected the drastic transformations brought on by cybered conflict.
To understand the challenges of cybered conflict, we need to drill down deeper than usual with regard to defense adaptation. Kuhn introduced the concept "paradigm shift" to describe a fundamental change in the basic concepts and experimental practices of a scientific discipline. Kuhn contrasted these shifts to normal science, which he described as scientific work done within a prevailing framework (or paradigm). Similarly, normal defense works well when the basics of the discipline remain unchallenged by a growing number of anomalies. Overall, we trust expertise. Bureaucracies are often the center of expertise on their respective topics by virtue of design and resources. For cybersecurity, most mature organizations still turn to their IT departments for solutions. Militaries, and their various armed services, are the bureaucracy experts: Generals are best equipped to manage armed conflict; Admirals would be the experts of choice in Naval warfare. This straightforward confidence in expertise is fine when things are normal. Most would prefer that their problems be taken care by experts rather than visionaries. However, during periods of profound change, expertise may become an obstacle to adaptation. The philosophy and sociology of science -as well as empirical studies of organizational change in business and defense -explain why challenges to accepted views are more likely to come from sources outside the dominant system. Experts are those who have the strongest credentials under an existing paradigm, however, these also tend to be credentialed by a system that has arisen from the existing paradigm. That is, their status as experts is not independent of the theory, but is a product of the theory's success to date (Hill & Gerras, 2016) . As Thomas Kuhn writes:
Almost always the men who achieve these fundamental inventions of a new paradigm have been either very young or very new to
the field whose paradigm they change (Kuhn, 1962) . Those we trust the most as experts are the least likely to recognize and identify anomalies, for the very reason that they are within the system. In armed forces, where the costs of failure can be catastrophic, bureaucracy is even less open to challenge. With experts who have not only professional authority, resources and prestige but also the power to command directly, the costs of subordinates questioning their expertise are prohibitive.
Adversarial challenges coupled with misguided defense adaptation have repeatedly created conditions where defense has been rendered obsolete. The same situation has been unfolding in the last decade. In Table 1 , a cyber RMA's catalyzing conditions are identified. A direct, destructive cyber-attack on civilian critical infrastructure breaks the fundamental strategic theory guiding every sovereign defense. As opposed to other types of attacks, cyberattacks on computerized Industrial Control Systems (ICS) operating civilian critical infrastructure can reach strategic homeland targets without encountering nation-grade defenders. Foreign adversaries contemplating a destructive attack on a homeland target in a developed nation certainly face multiple state-run military-grade lines of defense on land, sea and air. This is in fact the main reason for the high level of security that citizens of Western countries enjoy: adversaries opt not to engage in warfare they are likely to lose.
However, cybered conflict has exposed a profound organizational vulnerability of westernized nations. It highlights the failure to produce a cyber RMA in order to defend as expected by the fundamental strategic theory of deterrence. At best, commercial-grade and profitoriented technological solutions stand between a Stuxnet-like attack and homeland targets. Unlike most of history, militaries are not directly involved in protecting critical infrastructure or the homeland at large from strategic attacks. Foreign adversaries launching a direct, destructive cyberattack on a non-military homeland target in the U.S. or Israel will not encounter defenses by the superior military forces. Armed forces do not shield society from cyber-attacks.
Moreover, the cyber attribution problem also profoundly undermines deterrence in the current socio-technical-economic system's architecture. While by no means is this attribution problem inherent in the technology, it is the result of architectural choices made in TCP/IP & Internet reinforced by market incentives. These inherent design characteristics are not easy to change. With the growth in the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industry 4.0, the attack surface available to adversaries expands, presenting even more lucrative targets and readily employedattack vectors.
Peacetime Strategic Maladaptation
Maladaptation almost never manifests in total unawareness of a changing reality, and western defenses are far from denying the major challenges of cyber. Militaries, intelligence and law enforcement agencies welcome the notion of adopting cyber technology to improve execution of existing strategies, increase efficiencies and improve core capabilities. How do armed forces today use their cyber warfare capabilities? Defense organizations universally do their own cybersecurity: namely, protect their own existing assets and capabilities. Each of the military branches knows what it does, and is determined to continue to do those things with help of new technology. This is tactical defense adaptation to cyber.
In militaries, as in any other professional bureaucracy or knowledge discipline, experts are accustomed to the existing fundamentals. Experts naturalize the rules of the game so that these fundamentals are removed from the scope of debate. Within professional communities -in science and in defense -experts are repeatedly taught the core professional principles throughout their career development. The core principles that lie at the heart of their theories become deeply embedded into the dominant paradigm, akin to axioms or laws of nature, never to be questioned.
To challenge the core principles that lie at the heart of our theories is no simple task; to do so induces stiff expert opposition. The difficulty is that a profound change requires such a challenge.
One typical challenge is a war -a natural test that exposes many likely surprising obstacles and the risks of suffering a loss. Clearly, this is not a good option for U.S. or Israeli stakeholders.
Another and less painful type of challenge emerges from intellectual and political efforts external to the military and outside of war, perhaps in efforts to avoid one.. For the purpose of this paper, a bird's eye overview of three peacetime strategic maladaptation cases will suffice to illustrate the weight of internal expertise in preventing paradigm shifts. Among the telling cases which military innovation scholars have analyzed are the U.S. Army aviation revival, the Royal Navy failure to protect commercial shipping, and the IDF's initial refusal to adopt nontraditional responses to the rocket threat to Israel. (Griffin, 2017) . For the example of civilian-led challenge and then adaptation, I turn to develop an additional recent case study: Israel Defense Forces' doctrine versus short-range rockets and missiles.
U.S. Army aviation revival after World War II
During its formation as a stand-alone service in 1947, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) aggressively argued for a central role in winning the next war by declaring its strategic application of airpower couldwin the war by itself. The USAF possessed institutional and professional expertise, a certain degree of institutionalized independence, and the freedom to build the forces in accordance with its own vision.
The U.S. Army, however, required air support for most of its land missions. The mandate to operate aerial power, as well as the capability, now rested with the USAF in managing the dissonance between two different missions, force structures, organizations and capabilities, the USAF mostly renounced the need to fly combat support missions for the Army. The US Department of Defense (DOD), which houses the civilian oversight of the Armed Forces, was unable to optimize the Air Force's role as the single air service across the services.
In particular, the U.S. Army engaged in elaborate forms of resistance, culminating in a very peculiar outcome. Eventually, in direct denial of the top-level political decision for USAF "owning" the air domain, the Army was able to acquire, operate, and maintain its own parallel air force (Bergerson, 1978) . While fix-winged aircraft remained a USAF monopoly, the U.S. Army developed rotary-wing aerial firepower, i.e. helicopters armed with guns, rockets, and missiles (Bradin, 1994) .
In this case, the Army's achievements show how sustained actions of "bureaucratic insurgents" -activist reformers who oppose policy yet work to change it from inside the organization -can produce highly disrupting results. In current context, the point here is that the USAF -as an armed forces branch owning a domain -was able to decide what defense roles it would not play. Its assumption of expertise and disdain of contrary paradigms left the other service to scramble to meet the otherwise abandoned close air support needs from the domain it technically did not 'own' nor had expertise.. The USAF position was legitimated in large part due to the paradigm its experts held about what an Air Force did and did not do
Royal Navy Failure to Protect Commercial Shipping in WWI and WWII
The Royal Navy long enjoyed dominance of the world's ocean. The credit for its past success cemented the Navy's expertise in maritime defense. Unrestricted submarine warfare against commercial shipping was a very serious threat strategic to Britain in WWII. The German U-Boat threat already manifested on a smaller scale in WWI: U-Boats exposed the vulnerability of merchant shipping, on which the UK economy depended. In fact, U-Boats caused damages exceeded the Navy's expectations in WWI. (Herwig, 1996) The UK antisubmarine division of the naval staff did analyze the submarine experience from World War I. Its findings appeared in a technical history series shortly after 1918. Yet the Admiralty classified the volumes, making them inaccessible to most officers rising through the ranks; moreover, in 1939 it then declared them obsolete and destroyed them. Advocacy for antisubmarine warfare often resulted in the termination of one's career. Britain's naval doctrine, developed largely by the Admiralty experts, resisted changes requiring the shifting of resources to counter U-Boats. Traditional service beliefs operated against learning the lessons of I9I7-I9I8. The Royal Navy discounted the submarine menace and passed the threat on to the air staff for resolution. But the Royal Air Force (RAF), which had control of virtually all air assets throughout the interwar period, proved even more disinterested in antisubmarine warfare at high sea (Herwig, 1996) . In retrospect, air power advocates grossly exaggerated the airplane's role as a submarine killer. Royal Navy stubborn tenacity not to protect British merchant shipping is another example of a branch of armed forces owning a domain, and cherry-picking what parts of that domain it will accept as its responsibility. In Kuhn's terms, submarine warfare against commercial shipping was an anomaly that normal science (which gave primacy to surface vessels) could not explain. The established Royal Navy bureaucracy used its weight of expertise to keep its preferred vision of victory and doctrine tied to battleships and major fleet engagements, costing the nation extraordinary amounts of lives and treasures when the war began.
Moreover, this maladaptation was not exclusively British. Between the World Wars, the navies of Britain, Germany and the U.S. all disregarded convoy protection and antisubmarine work.
In terms of an overarching doctrinal framework, the major naval establishments were united in the belief that submarines could never constitute true sea power and exercise either sea control or sea denial. This staunch orthodoxy worked to block innovation (Herwig, 1996) .
Israel's doctrine versus short-range rockets and missiles
Since 1969, the short-range rocket threat to Israel's homeland from the Northern border has been persistent. In 2001, it also materialized from the Gaza Strip in the South. 7 As most of these rocket attacks caused no significant damage, the IDF routinely disregarded the strategic and With the IDF playing a dominant role in Israel's security policy, the military experts chose to disregard the "flying tubes." The IDF contributed to overconfidence in Israel's deterrent. One senior expert demonstrated the mindset proclaiming Hezbollah's rocket arsenal will "rust" in 7 As most of these did no material damage, the strategic and psychological aspects were routinely disregarded by the IDF. 8 It started in large part to prevent bombardment on citizens of Northern Israel. The official Operation Peace for Galilee goal was to push the threat beyond the effective rocket range of 40 kilometers. Towards a Cyber Defense Paradigm Shift and RMA To achieve national cyber security, one must challenge the established defense assumptions that have been formed as a result of centuries of war experience promoting particular paradigms in strategic defense adaptation. To succeed means a paradigm shift in defense, ie, a revolution in military affairs. How can we make this happen? A central finding of theoretical and empirical research is that threat awareness and the availability of technology are insufficient to drive an RMA. Technology enables the change: it sets the parameters of the possible, but cannot determine the exact type, direction and pace of change. Peacetime strategic defense maladaptation often does not stem from a lack of technology; rather it occurs because defense organizations are not willing to, not forced to, or not able to truly change their ways. (Murray, 2011) .
One of the most serious impediments to effective adaptation is that bureaucracies do not exist for the purpose of adapting to a changing and uncertain world. In fact, most bureaucracies oppose change, because it represents a direct threat to their position. Military bureaucracies proved absolutely necessary for the functioning of military institutions, but at the same time they have more often than not proved the enemy of innovation in peacetime
Military disasters are great promoters of defense change, but we would rather avoid this route. The civil-military model developed by Posen in the early 1980's concludes that interwar (i.e. "peacetime") military innovation will only occur if civilian statesmen intervene in the development of military service doctrine, preferably with the assistance of maverick officers 10 from within the service (Posen, 1984) . Peacetime innovation requires military allies. Other researchers (Cote, 1996) have argued that civilian leaders can leverage and "manipulate interservice competition to cause doctrinal innovation," i.e. peacetime strategic innovation. However, Halutz said that short-range imprecise and small rockets are not a decisive weapon (Shelah, Limor, & Kats, 2007) . This was technically correct. The IAF doctrine relied on superior intelligence and precision strike capabilities. This not only enables to destroy larger launchers, but also to enhance deterrence, including by decapitation. The main arguments against intercepting the rockets were that it was strategically unwise, technically impossible 11 , and prohibitively expensive. arsenal, in a long-planned and well-executed raid (Lambeth, 2011 (Rubin, 2007) . The strategic and political results of the war were poor, resulting in the removal of the Prime Minister and IDF Chief of Staff from office, and a profound political upheaval.
Despite the Israeli outcry over the IDF's failure to achieve a clear-cut victory (Kober, 2008) , Hezbollah has refrained from launching rockets to Israel for over a decade, which suggests deterrence (Sobelman, 2017 Moreover, despite the obvious value of defending the civilian population against intermittent shortrange rocket barrages, the decision to defend actively was made and implemented against the will of the IDF general staff, the IAF air defense leaders, and most security experts. The fact that the Iron Dome active missile defense system was developed and fielded epitomizes successful defense adaptation. It also is a strong example of the difficulties that strategic defense adaptation needs to overcome. Future research can use this case to explore the validity of military innovation models (Grissom, 2006) The civil-military military innovation model argues that peacetime military innovation occurs if civilians intervene in military service doctrinal development, preferably with the assistance of maverick officers from within the service (Posen, 1984) . Both the civilian top-down intervention (Peretz) and the military champion of change (Gold) were driving forces in Iron Dome. Additionally, the Inter-Service Military Innovation model suggests that more such initiatives are to be expected. In pursuit of now-lucrative homeland defense missions against lower-intensity threats, land forces, artillery corps and infantry are likely to promote alternative tactics and platforms to counter the short-range rocket threat.
Conclusion
This analysis spells trouble for the U.S. and its allies. Armed forces, intelligence organizations and defense ministries have amassed the most advanced and substantial cyber warfare capabilities and capacities. Nevertheless, ministries of defense and armed forces are, at best, bystanders in national cyber defense; they only marginally assist in defending homeland critical targets. The endgame is that, asforeign adversaries wage cybered conflict inflicting significant economic and social toll at the homeland, their appetites and arrogance are growing.
The Western failure in peacetime strategic defense adaptation -by the armed forces in particular -is the underlying cause of this profound strategic anomaly. A direct, destructive cyberattack on civilian critical infrastructure violates the fundamental strategic theory guiding every sovereign defense. In fact, all branches of armed forces are sticking to their guns, embracing cyber technology only for existing missions, and leaving their sovereign defense responsibilities unfulfilled in a cybered threat rich world.
Cybered conflict demands new missions, doctrine and force structure, at the expense of older ones. Simply seeking and deploying more sophisticated technology within existing organizations will not improve security. Models of defense adaptation stress the importance of political and organizational aspects. But maladaptation occurs because defense organizations are either not willing to, not forced to, or not able to change. The role of expertise is significant.
Generals often uphold a common and dated cyber defense position: armed forces cannot be responsible for defending society from cyber-attacks on strategic non-military homeland targets by foreign adversaries. They argue that national cybersecurity practices are incompatible with the established authority, structure, and ways of practice of armed forces. The expert's analysis of the past ways and established practices of warfighting are taken to be correct. Indeed, a common slippery slope argument is that democratic societies should not accept defense at the presumed cost of militarization of domestic affairs and erosion of basic freedoms.
But what if the core capabilities for defending society in cybered conflicts differ from the past? Would defense organizations and their experts be able to recognize it, and lead a radical adaptation that retires much of their cherished traditions and endangers their expertise? Security
Studies theory, philosophy of science, and empirical evidence all suggest that profound defense adaptation demands external pressure on the expert organization. The recent Iron Dome case study shows that civilian outsider pressure and insider champions of change within the military are both necessary for strategic adaptation. In both the US and in Israel, insufficient challenge to the established paradigm is hindering the necessary development of a cyber RMA. This analysis may help military and civilian stakeholders to drastically improve national cyber security instead of waiting for the losses of war to force true RMA adaptations.
